

FY21 Office of Health Care Quality Hospital Patient Safety Update

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March 4, 2022

Disclosures

• No Disclosures



Objectives

- Review history of Maryland Patient Safety Program
- Review current requirements
- Share reporting data, including a summary of FY21 data
- Share certain significant events
- Share considerations for hospitals



OHCQ Mission & Vision

- Protect the health and safety of Marylanders
- Ensure public confidence in the health care and community delivery systems
- Vision that all care recipients can trust
 - Their health care facility or program is licensed
 - Has met the regulatory requirements for the services they offer



Patient Safety Program Overview

- Established by law and enacted in March 2004
- COMAR 10.07.06
- Serves to provide a safe environment for patients in Maryland hospitals
- Requires hospitals to identify adverse events
- Encourages near miss reporting
- Requires disclosure to patients and families
- Over 5,000 adverse events reported since 2004



Adverse Event Reporting

- Level 1 Resulted in death or serious disability
 - Joint Commission Sentinel Events
 - National Quality Forum "Never Events"
- Level 2 Required medical intervention to prevent death or serious disability
- Level 3 Does not result in death or serious disability and does not require medical intervention to prevent death or disability



Adverse Event Reporting

- Level 1 Required to report within 5 days of discovery
 - Submit RCA and actions within 60 days
- Level 2 RCA required, but not submitted
- Level 3 No RCA required



OHCQ Patient Safety Site

MARYLAND DE Office of	PARTMENT OF HEALTH Health Care Quality				
Programs	Consumers Patient Safety Grants Regulations Reports				
QUICK LINKS	Maryland Hospital Patient Safety Program				
Licensee Directories File a Complaint	In 2004, legislation was enacted that requires hospitals to report serious adverse events that cause death or serious injury. Serious injury is defined as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an individual and lasts more than seven days or is still present at the time of discharge. OHCQ's Maryland Hospital Patient Safety Program reviews each event and provides feedback to the hospital on their root cause analysis. The regulations for the program are found in COMAR 10.07.06.				
Long Term Care COVID-19 Dashboard	Tool Kit				
OHCQ Career Opportunities	The tools section contains the regulatory language and tools hospitals can use to report and review adverse events, including short forms for pressure ulcers and falls, requests to downgrade events, an event reporting form, and a sample RCA evaluation.				
ANNOUNCEMENTS	 Initial Report of an Adverse Event Adverse Event Reporting and Decision Tree 				



- Reporting reflects a transparent learning culture of continuous improvement
- Hospitals are not judged for the number of reported events
- Hospital Patient Safety Program ensures the quality of RCAs and actions



- Maryland hospitals classified as:
 - Acute general
 - Psychiatric
 - Chronic
 - Children's
 - Rehabilitation



- Acute general hospitals account for 73% of all licensed Maryland hospitals
- Acute general hospitals reported 97% of the Level 1 adverse events in FY21
- Psychiatric and rehabilitation hospitals accounted for 4 percent of reports



FY21 Reporting

Hospital Size	Number of Hospitals	Total Events Reported FY21	Reported Events per Hospital FY21	Percent Change from FY20
300 or more beds	11	225	20	125%
200 – 299 beds	15	215	14	128%
100 – 199 beds	14	110	8	40%
< 100 beds	22	37	2	12%







FY21 Level 1 Events





FY20 Compared to FY21





RCA Requirements

- COMAR 10.07.06.06 states:
 - C. The root cause analysis shall examine the cause and effect of the event through an impartial process by:
 - (1) Analysis of human and other factors;
 - (2) Analysis of related processes and systems;
 - (3) Analysis of underlying cause and effect systems through a series of "why" questions; and
 - (4) Identification of risks and possible contributing factors



Causal Factors





Corrective Actions





- Any Stage 3, Stage 4, and unstageable pressure ulcers acquired after admission
- Report all HAPIs except:
 - Wounds acquired pre-admission that progress, as long as recognized at admission
 - Deep tissue injuries (DTIs) unless evolve into or debrided into Stage III or IV wounds
 - Kennedy ulcers that arise during the hypoperfusion state in the 24 to 48 hours prior to death







- A 63-year-old patient was diagnosed with COVID-19 infection and was brought to the hospital after experiencing extreme fatigue, loss of appetite, and inability to get out of bed. The patient arrived at the ED with extreme hypoxia.
 - Patient placed on non-rebreather oxygen and then BiPAP
 - After 9 days on BiPAP, the patient was intubated
 - Patient remained intubated for 39 days, but could not tolerate proning
 - WOCN consult initial assessment did not include the sacral area because the patient was too unstable
 - Air mattress ordered, but it was not plugged into the air pump
 - Patient developed a Stage 3 pressure injury to the sacrum



- Thorough skin assessment should always be done
- Check under tubing and devices
- Placing multi-layer foam dressings on bony prominences prior to proning reduces risk of pressure injury



- Securing devices with adhesive and plastic anchors can be lifted and multilayer foam dressings be placed underneath to protect the skin
- Medical tubes and devices cause 30 percent of inhospital pressure injuries
 - Proper security of medical tubes and devices is crucial to pressure injury prevention



- Standard pillows, as well as donut-shaped pillows, should not be used to support the head while proning
- Specialized foam head cushions are preferred because they have tunneled spaces that allow for passage of the endotracheal tube
- Swimmer's position is the preferred method of patient body positioning when proning
- OHCQ notes in the system when the standard of care has been met



Falls

- Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality:
 - More than one-third of hospital falls result in injury, including serious injuries such as fractures and head trauma
- Death or serious injury from a fall in a health care facility is considered a never event
- Fall prevention in hospitals is a balance between:
 - Managing a patient's underlying fall risk factors
 - Enabling the patient to maintain autonomy while adapting to the unfamiliar hospital environment



Fall Reporting





Fall Outcomes





Fall

- A patient presented to the ED with generalized weakness and shortness of breath
- Admitted with a diagnosis of sepsis, anemia, and a suspected pancreatic mass
- Two days after admission the patient sustained an unwitnessed fall, but denied hitting their head



Fall

- The primary nurse documented notifying a physician about the fall, but did not document the name of the provider called
- No post-fall patient assessment by a provider
- Four hours after the fall, the patient began having anxiety and difficulty concentrating
- Two days later, the patient became hostile and was alert only to self



Fall

- After two more days, a rapid response was called when the patient became unresponsive to painful stimuli
- A CT scan revealed an acute hemorrhage and the patient was taken to the OR for right craniotomy and hematoma evacuation
- A brain flow study revealed no cerebral profusion consistent with brain death
- The patient was pronounced dead



Falls

- Engage the patient and family in the fall prevention process
- Assess fall risk at the original point of encounter
- Tailor interventions to the patient
- Staff should ensure that the right strategy is used for the right patient



Falls

- Telesitter may not be appropriate for every patient
- When using telesitter, consider what to use should the patient need to travel off unit
- Ensure beds and other equipment are operational



- Surgical events include all patient/procedure events along with:
 - retained foreign objects (RFOs),
 - intraoperative death in healthy individuals having lowrisk procedures,
 - unanticipated intraoperative or
 - immediately post-operative deaths







- A patient underwent surgical procedure for a right long finger trigger release
- Consent obtained and site marked at bedside
- Report was given to the OR team with consent, history and physical, and site marking verified
- The patient was prepped and draped
- The OR team called a time-out prior to the start of the procedure



- The surgeon did not mark the site where the incision was to be made
- The dorsal side of the right hand was marked
- The surgeon started the incision on the lateral part of the right hand which was visibly unmarked



- At the postoperative evaluation in the surgeon's office two weeks later, the surgeon identified that the wrong finger (the right ring finger, not the long finger) had been operated on
- The patient was rescheduled for a procedure on the correct finger
- The surgeon stated he did not mark the lateral side of the right hand because marking would be in the way of his incision



- OR Staff should count in and count out (sponges, tools, and equipment)
- Use evidence-based tools like sponge counters
- Don't close the patient until all items going in have been counted out
- Clearly mark site near the point of incision
- Ensure staff are all in for the time out (not distracted, not multitasking, and attentive)
- Clearly define roles and responsibilities including backup, when needed



- A 93-year-old patient on telemetry monitoring was transferred from her inpatient room on the fourth floor to the first floor for scheduled imaging studies
- While the patient was having the imaging studies completed, the monitor tech notified the patient's nurse that the patient's heart rate was bradycardic
- Staff did not know the patient's location in the Imaging Department and had difficulty finding her



- Eventually, the vascular lab tech confirmed that the patient was in the Vascular Lab and awaiting transport back to her room
- When the Vascular Lab tech checked on the patient, she was unresponsive
- A Code Blue was called
- Patient was resuscitated and transferred to the ICU
- All heroic measures were discontinued, and the patient expired



Alarm Fatigue

- An acute myocardial infarction patient underwent cardiac catheterization with stenting
- After the procedure, the patient was admitted to the telemetry unit on continuous cardiac monitoring
- Bilateral restraints for safety had been ordered for the patient



Alarm Fatigue

- The patient was found several hours later in her room in cardiac arrest
- A retrospective review of telemetry data indicated the patient had an episode of tachycardia, then continuous "leads fail" alerts for approximately 2 hours
- Review of monitor data found that these alerts had been repeatedly silenced



Delays in Treatment

- Assess alarms, monitoring functionality to avoid alarm fatigue
- Ensure that there are redundancies and contingencies for responsibilities for critical alarm updates or configurations for safety
- Ensure that the staff are knowledgeable in all functions of the monitoring equipment to prevent accidental silencing or canceling of critical alarms



Delays in Treatment

- Develop or optimize processes for interdepartmental communication
- Ensure patients are appropriate for travel
- Implement rounding and bedside handoff for care team communication and collaboration



Physical or Sexual Assaults





Physical or Sexual Assaults

- Assaults may be random and unprovoked
- Provide physical and emotional support to staff in areas with an increased risk of assaults
- Ensure staff are trained and competent in deescalation tactics
- Promote a just culture that includes zero tolerance for reckless behavior, such as intentionally unsafe or criminal acts



- A 34-year-old patient was a restrained driver involved in a front-end car collision with air bag deployment
- The orthopedics team recommended surgical stabilization
- During open reduction and internal fixation in the OR, the patient coded, and the procedure was aborted
- CPR was performed and CT was completed showing bilateral pulmonary embolism
- The patient was transferred to the ICU, where he coded again and ultimately expired



- Subsequent review identified that orders for deep vein thrombosis (DVT) prophylaxis had been omitted for one-and-a-half days
- The orthopedics team recommended DVT prophylaxis, but did not verify whether it had been ordered
- The surgical team's physician assistant documented in the progress notes that the patient was on DVT prophylaxis, but there was no order placed in EMR



- Prior to surgery, the surgical team did not fully review orders and evaluate the patient
- The surgical provider failed to follow the protocol for placing medication orders in the EMR



- An Emergency Department (ED) physician consulted with a neurologist about initiating intravenous immune globulin (IVIG) medication regime for myasthenia gravis
- The neurologist recommended the patient receive IVIG 2 gm/kg over 5 days (that is, 0.4 gm/kg daily for 5 days)
- The ED provider ordered 2 gm/kg daily for five days



- The patient received eight (8) grams total over four days before a pharmacist caught the error
- The treatment team contacted Poison Control, which recommended plasmapheresis
- The patient had a religious objection to transfusion and refused
- The intensivist also contacted a specialty team to explore bloodless alternatives



- Use of erythropoietin and iron were recommended
- The treatment team also ordered steroids, but interventions were not successful
- The patient developed acute renal failure due to the medication error and became severely anemic
- The patient expired as a result of the IVIG infusion overdose



Fatal Accidental Oxygen Supply Shutoff

- Maintenance staff inadvertently closed a valve on the medical oxygen supply line that feeds the ICUs, ED, and patient care areas
- The staff member thought the valve was a medical air tie-in valve that was installed previously during facility construction
- At the time of the incident, the ceiling tile frame beneath this valve was labeled "TIE-IN FOR CCU/HOSP MED AIR."



Fatal Accidental Oxygen Supply Shutoff

- A loss of oxygen supply was evident immediately by:
 - all ventilators alarming,
 - the call bell system alarms,
 - ICU medical gas zone alarm panels also alarming
- While the oxygen valve was closed, resuscitation was initiated on three patients
- Two patients died and a third died within a day



Fatal Accidental Oxygen Supply Shutoff

- Findings from the investigation included:
 - Medical gas labeling inaccuracies,
 - Ceiling valves not locked,
 - Alarm panels outdated or missing,
 - Communication breakdowns between maintenance staff and contractors,
 - Lack of communication between maintenance staff and clinical leaders regarding medical gas, and
 - General medical gas knowledge deficit



Creating High Reliability in Healthcare

Summary

- Creating a culture of safety with a high reliability mindset is essential
- Overcome:
 - Production pressures,
 - Staffing challenges, and
 - Disrupters like the COVID-19 pandemic



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Questions



